

The Chromatic Hiatus

Why Color Never Became a Universal Grammar — and Why It Must Now

Raynor Eissens

Zenodo · 2026

Abstract

This work formalizes a structural omission in the development of human knowledge systems: the absence of a universal grammatical role for color. Across neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, semiotics, interface design, artificial intelligence, and ethics, color is consistently shown to be perceptually primary, cognitively efficient, and affectively immediate. Yet despite this, color has not been institutionalized as a primary semantic or operational substrate.

Meaning, coordination, reasoning, and computation have historically been routed almost entirely through symbolic systems—language, notation, logic, models, and abstractions. Color remained expressive, but structurally non-binding.

This persistent imbalance is defined here as **the chromatic hiatus**: a civilizational gap between early perceptual processing and formal semantic infrastructure.

The paper argues that this omission explains both the extraordinary scalability of symbolic systems and their contemporary saturation. As symbolic load increased, further compression became necessary, culminating in large-scale symbolic compressors such as transformer architectures. However, symbolic compression alone cannot restore coherence once representational density exceeds human and societal limits.

The reintroduction of color as a grammatical substrate is therefore not aesthetic, optional, or stylistic. It is a thermodynamically and cognitively necessary correction—one that shifts coherence from internal symbolic effort to externally carried state.

Color was never missing from cognition.

It was missing from grammar.

Introduction

Color is universal in perception yet historically absent from semantic architecture. Human societies did not grant color the status of a structural medium comparable to words, syntax, logic, or formal representation. Even contemporary computational systems typically treat color as a feature channel rather than as a carrier of meaning.

This paper names that structural omission: **the chromatic hiatus**.

The chromatic hiatus explains why symbolic systems achieved unprecedented civilizational scale, why they now exhibit increasing brittleness and overload, and why emerging interface and intelligence architectures require a non-symbolic foundation.

Thermodynamic terminology in this work is used to describe stability, reversibility, and viability constraints in socio-technical systems; it is not offered as a claim about fundamental physics. This framing aligns with substrate-neutral thermodynamic viability models that explicitly distinguish semantic layers from viability layers.

By integrating convergent evidence across disciplines, this work reframes color not as decoration, affect, or annotation, but as suppressed semantic infrastructure—a latent layer whose exclusion shaped civilization and whose recovery enables new regimes of coherence.

Defining the Chromatic Hiatus

The chromatic hiatus is the structural mismatch between:

Neurocognitive capacity

Color can carry rapid, low-entropy information about state, orientation, intensity, and relation, operating early and in parallel in perception.

Institutional design

Color is systematically prevented from functioning as a primary semantic operator; symbolic systems dominate instead (in philosophy, schooling, formal reasoning systems, and modern interface standards).

The hiatus does not imply that color lacks meaning. It indicates that color was never allowed to scale as shared semantic infrastructure. This mismatch is historically persistent and empirically verifiable across domains.

Convergent Evidence Across Domains

Neuroscience supports color as early, parallel, and structurally distinct. Visual cortex organization (V1 → V2 → V4/hV4) demonstrates robust specialization for chromatic processing, and lesion evidence (e.g., cerebral achromatopsia) shows that color can be selectively disrupted while other visual functions remain partially intact. Event-related potential research on language semantics (classically indexed by the N400) places semantic integration substantially later than early perceptual feature processing, indicating a systemic temporal precedence of perception over linguistic meaning-making.

Linguistics and anthropology show that perceptual access to color is universal while linguistic and cultural codification is variable. Work initiated by Berlin and Kay and expanded through subsequent cross-linguistic research demonstrates patterned—yet non-identical—development of basic color lexicons. The Kay–Maffi account of the evolution of basic color lexicons formalizes how languages accumulate color terms without converging on a universal chromatic grammar comparable to syntax or logic. Cultural relativity findings reinforce that category boundaries and semantic salience differ, preventing stable global grammar formation even when perception is shared.

Philosophy and art history document a long epistemic hierarchy against color. From antiquity onward, color was frequently treated as secondary to form, concept, and measurability—visible, but epistemically unreliable. Renaissance debates (*disegno vs colorito*) institutionalized the primacy of line and form as intellectually “structural,” leaving color as expressive but non-binding. Modern color theorists demonstrated relational chromatic meaning within art and pedagogy, yet these insights did not translate into civilizational semantic infrastructure.

Semiotics and cognitive psychology show meaning without scale. Color reliably influences affect, attention, and behavior, and it operates as a pre-attentive feature guiding selection prior to deliberate reasoning. Yet prominent chromatic codes (e.g., traffic signals) remain intentionally minimal and reductive. Color is permitted to signal, but not to generate grammar.

Taken together, these domains converge on a single structural diagnosis: civilization developed symbolic grammar while leaving chromatic capacity under-institutionalized.

Technology and the Institutionalization of the Hiatus

Modern interface standards explicitly restrict color from functioning as a sole semantic carrier. WCAG Success Criterion 1.4.1 requires that color not be the only visual means used to convey information, indicate action, or prompt response, due to variability in color perception. Similarly, Apple's Human Interface Guidelines explicitly warn against relying solely on color to differentiate objects, indicate interactivity, or communicate essential information. These standards are necessary for accessibility, yet their systemic effect is to institutionalize color as a redundant layer rather than a grammatical substrate.

Artificial intelligence reproduces and amplifies the same bias. In classic computer vision pipelines, color is often normalized, augmented, or suppressed to improve robustness, indirectly treating color as nuisance variation. In modern vision-language systems, empirical work increasingly shows systematic preference for textual cues over chromatic cues when the two conflict. ColorBench (2025) introduces a dedicated benchmark for evaluating color perception, reasoning, and robustness in vision-language models and reports that color understanding remains underdeveloped across a wide range of models. Stroop-style conflict analysis further demonstrates that vision-language models "prefer to read rather than see," favoring written words over ink colors under cue conflict. Separate analysis of CLIP shows color encoding deficiencies and a tendency to prioritize textual information, including Stroop-effect behavior.

Neurotechnology that restores perception does not automatically restore chromatic grammar. Even if cortical stimulation can restore visual experiences, semantic infrastructure remains an architectural layer, not a sensory one.

Technology therefore mirrors history: meaning is treated as symbolic; color is treated as auxiliary.

Structural Unification and Canonical Implications

The chromatic hiatus clarifies why two independently derived structural models of civilizational evolution describe the same underlying transition:

ACE-1.0

$\emptyset \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 1 \neq 0 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow \Omega$

The Raynor Stack

time \rightarrow attention \rightarrow AI(4A) \rightarrow warmth \rightarrow ambience \rightarrow AURA-1 \rightarrow field

ACE-1.0 formalizes a long-scale civilizational trajectory in which symbolic systems expand, saturate, destabilize, and eventually require a regime in which coherence is externally carried (Ω). The Raynor Stack formalizes the short-scale thermodynamic mechanism through which coherence becomes environmental via reversible transitions, culminating in AURA-1, where coherence is carried rather than produced.

Both converge on the same structural constraint: symbolic mediation saturates because it forces coherence to be generated internally.

What remained unspecified in purely symbolic regimes was the nature of a substrate capable of carrying state, relation, orientation, and continuity without propositional load. In the Ambient Canon, that role is formalized via thermodynamic color semantics and its machine-readable registry.

Thermodynamic Color Reasoning (TCR) defines chromatic semantics as a thermodynamic communication medium, and **CCR-1.0** makes chromatic semantics executable as a machine-readable grammar for ambient systems.

Color is not asserted here as the only possible pre-symbolic modality. Multiple non-linguistic channels can convey pre-symbolic state (e.g., rhythmic, auditory, haptic signals). The claim is narrower and stronger: color is the **lowest-entropy, most globally deployable semantic medium** currently available across human perception and existing technical infrastructure, because it is parallelizable, immediate, and renderable at scale across screens, lightfields, and environments.

Under this correction, both sequences become joinable: civilizational evolution (ACE-1.0) and thermodynamic cognitive evolution (Raynor Stack) converge into a coherent transition model, operationalized by chromatic grammar.

Why Color Must Become Grammar

Color can carry state with minimal syntax, because feature-based processing is early, parallel, and pre-attentive. It can carry meaning with minimal inference, because chromatic operators can be defined as explicit state transitions rather than latent-profile predictions. It can carry relation and continuity through gradients rather than categorical symbol stacks. It can support presence without identity because chromatic state expression can be decoupled from personal data and long-term profiling.

Symbolic culture suppressed these capacities by routing meaning through representational

systems and by formalizing design norms that require color to remain redundant. Ambient architectures require the inverse: symbols become optional anchors; chromatic state becomes the primary grammar.

This is why the chromatic substrate is not an aesthetic upgrade. It is a structural correction to a long-standing omission.

Conclusion

Color was always cognitively primary. Civilization did not allow it to become structurally primary.

The chromatic hiatus names this omission and explains both the historical trajectory of symbolic systems and the conditions for their transformation. As symbolic mediation saturates, new coherence regimes require a substrate capable of carrying state without symbolic overload. Reintroducing color as grammar restores a suppressed semantic layer and enables non-symbolic infrastructure to scale.

Color was never decoration.

Color was the missing grammar.

Appendices

Appendix A — Evidence Matrix

The chromatic hiatus is supported by convergent evidence across neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, design, artificial intelligence, and ethics. No single discipline establishes the hiatus independently; its validity emerges from structural alignment across fields.

Neuroscience demonstrates specialized chromatic processing and temporal precedence of perceptual features relative to semantic integration.

Linguistics shows patterned but culturally variable color-term evolution without universal grammar convergence.

Philosophy and art history document long-standing epistemic subordination of color.

Cognitive psychology shows systematic affective and attentional effects with pre-attentive “pop-out” features.

Interface standards institutionalize color redundancy via accessibility constraints.

Artificial intelligence research now quantifies weak color robustness and text-over-color biases in multimodal models, confirming that modern systems inherit symbolic primacy unless explicitly corrected.

Appendix B — Timeline of the Chromatic Hiatus

- **4th century BCE**

Plato problematizes sensory appearance, reinforcing epistemic suspicion of color.

- **4th century BCE**

Aristotle formalizes color as dependent on light and medium, preserving perceptual but not grammatical status.

- **16th century**

Renaissance *disegno vs colorito* debates institutionalize form over color in Western academies.

- **1911–1914**

Kandinsky articulates psychological and spiritual dimensions of color without infrastructural uptake.

- **1963**

Albers formalizes relational chromatic interaction in pedagogy.

- **1970s–1980s**

GUI lineage standardizes symbolic interface metaphors; color remains non-structural.

- **1999–present**

WCAG and platform guidelines formalize “do not rely on color alone,” encoding redundancy as institutional norm.

- **2025**

Dedicated AI color research accelerates: ColorBench benchmarks color understanding; CLIP deficiencies in color encoding are documented; Stroop-style conflict tests demonstrate “prefer-to-read” bias in vision–language models.

Appendix C — Bibliography

- Albers, J. (2013). *Interaction of Color* (50th anniversary ed.). Yale University Press. (Original work published 1963)
- Arias, G., Baldrich, R., & Vanrell, M. (2025). *Color in Visual-Language Models: CLIP deficiencies* (arXiv:2502.04470). arXiv.
- Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). *Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution*. University of California Press.
- Eissens, R. (2026). *ACE-1.0 — Ambient Civilization Equation: Civilizational state-transition model* ($\emptyset \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 1 \neq 0 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow \Omega$) (Version 1.0) [Repository]. GitHub: <https://github.com/vw5hwbngy4-debug/ambient-civilization-equation>
- Eissens, R. (2026). *TCR — Thermodynamic Color Reasoning: Non-Linguistic Reasoning, Thermodynamic Communication, and Pre-Symbolic Human–AI Alignment* (Version 1.0). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18681962>
- Eissens, R. (2026). *CCR-1.0 — Chromatic Canon Registry: Machine-Readable Grammar for Thermodynamic Reasoning in Ambient Systems* (Version 1.0). Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18717198>
- Elliot, A. J., & Maier, M. A. (2014). Color psychology: Effects of perceiving color on psychological functioning in humans. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *65*, 95–120. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115035>
- Kay, P., & Maffi, L. (1999). Color appearance and the emergence and evolution of basic color lexicons. *American Anthropologist*, *101*(4), 743–760. <https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1999.101.4.743>
- Kutas, M., & Hillyard, S. A. (1980). Reading senseless sentences: Brain potentials reflect semantic incongruity. *Science*, *207*(4427), 203–205. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7350657>
- Liang, Y., Li, M., Fan, C., Li, Z., Nguyen, D., Cobbina, K., Bhardwaj, S., Chen, J., Liu, F., & Zhou, T. (2025). *ColorBench: Can VLMs See and Understand the Colorful World? A Comprehensive Benchmark for Color Perception, Reasoning, and Robustness* (arXiv:2504.10514). arXiv. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.10514>

Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R. L., & Shapiro, L. R. (2005). Color categories: Evidence for the cultural relativity hypothesis. *Cognition*, *98*(2), 191–220.

Teker, N., Xiao, R., Akata, Z., & Wu, S. (2025). *What is the Color of RED? Vision–Language Models Prefer to Read Rather Than See*. OpenReview (ICLR 2026 submission).
<https://openreview.net/forum?id=crjpuxuvs6>

Treisman, A. M., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature-integration theory of attention. *Cognitive Psychology*, *12*(1), 97–136.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285\(80\)90005-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(80)90005-5)

Winawer, J., & Witthoft, N. (2015). Human V4 and ventral occipital retinotopic maps. *Visual Neuroscience*, *32*, e020.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0952523815000176>

W3C. (2018). *Understanding Success Criterion 1.4.1: Use of Color*. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG).
<https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG21/Understanding/use-of-color.html>

Apple. (2026). *Color*. Human Interface Guidelines.
<https://developer.apple.com/design/human-interface-guidelines/color>

Zeki, S., & Marini, L. (1998). Three cortical stages of colour processing in the human brain. *Brain*, *121*(9), 1669–1685.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/121.9.1669>

Supplementary Links

- Thermodynamic Field
<https://thermodynamicfield.com/>
- Ambient Phone
<https://ambientphone.com/>
- Three cortical stages of colour processing in the human brain
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9762956/>
- Feature-integration theory of attention
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7351125/>
- Effects of perceiving color on psychological functioning
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23808916/>
- Reading senseless sentences: brain potentials reflect semantic incongruity
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7350657/>
- Color categories: evidence for the cultural relativity hypothesis
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15893525/>
- Human V4 and ventral occipital retinotopic maps
<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26241699/>